I found Chakarvarty’s discussion, in the introductory chapter, insightful for three reasons: 1) it calls attention to the contradictions presents within enlightenment thought itself, making it that much more difficult for scholars, who are indeed products of this mode of thinking, to fully ascribe agency to the peasant – the peasant is a citizen, but he/she also has to be made into the citizen. Indeed, these contradictions reveal why, even when the peasant is present at its own making, he/she is only present in a pre-political fashion. It reveals how our mode of thinking, creates certain opportunities, but also limits other possibilities. 2) It addresses the nature of global historical time, and the manner in which this historicist time, creates cultural difference, and in doing so, becomes a way of saying “not yet” to someone. Chakarvarty’s discussion is particularly relevant for our discussions, because it reveals that even our sense of time, contains within it a power relationship, and perpetuates subalternity by negating certain groups of their complete political agency. It also reveals that there is no way that we can truly speak of human agency if we keep ascribing to this evolutionary understanding of history – even implicitly. Enlightenment thought is based on the idea of progress – that history is moving in one direction, and that we are moving in one direction, but in doing so, it necessarily excludes those that are  left out of the mainstream of history, or choose to follow an opposing direction.  3) It deals with the importance of not only understanding the process of transition but also translation. I don’t really understand however why scholars are stuck in the paradigm of the pre-political and the political, why are these particular terms so important – what even makes the political the political. Does being political mean being more rational, and pre-political equate to being irrational. I just want to understand how we are defining the political, when the enlightenment concept of the political itself contains within it a number of contradictions.
In chapter 5, Chakarvarty deals with the relationship between the observer and the observed – which is mediated by this enlightenment mode of seeing. I found this chapter useful because it reveals that nothing is a given with respect to how we see/frame a particular problem – the mere fact that we even see suffering and feel empathy doesn’t mean that this is a universally applicable natural relationship. Rather, it is a product of a particular mode of seeing. But more importantly, Chakarvarty calls attention to how we understand the “other” (and its action) when it stands outside of our particular mode of seeing. Indeed, the mere fact that sati doesn’t generate compassion doesn’t mean that the community is not exercising reason. Indeed, reason itself needs to be understood as a historical concept. The dominant way of either ascribing enlightenment reason universal applicability, or of retreating into infinite individuality, are therefore both inadequate means of approaching the problem. The dichotomy of the individual and the universal, the objective and the subjective needs to be addressed if we are to engage with the other, without losing a sense of ourselves. Indeed, silencing equally occurs when we say that we are all the same, or that we are each uniquely different.