Spivak seems to
be simultaneously engaged in a number of interdependent historiographical questions,
and in doing so is building upon, critiquing and responding to a number of
scholars. One of her primary concerns seems to be with the question of ideology
- she calls attention to the complete negation of the question of ideology by
the Foucault and Deleuze. I am not sure, but it seems as though she is arguing
that ideology is an essential component in bridging the gap between theory and
practice - that without taking into account the importance of ideology, the politics of theoretical production and
its materialization in practice cannot really be properly conceived. Indeed, as
she discusses, that the production of theory is itself a particular practice. In making this argument, the
investigator and his positionality becomes immediately important and indeed
complicit in reproducing subalternity. Closely related to this question seems
to be that of representation – as both to speak for in the political sense, and
to re-present in the philosophical sense. Again Spivak calls attention to the
way in which both are interdependent, and feed into one another, and yet should
not be completely conflated. I assume that, as was discussed in the previous classes, that Spivak may be
arguing that our historiographical divides/demarcations create similar divides
in history. The issue of epistemic violence is therefore crucial for her analysis.
I think that
related to these questions are those regarding the notion of a signifier, as we
discussed in the previous class. Spivak is critiquing both Foucalt and Deleuze
for ignoring the importance of signifiers. Indeed, he mentions that these scholars
argue that "A theory is like a box of tools. Nothing to do with the
signifier" (FD, 208). I found it interesting how Spivak discusses the way
in which women, events, categories becomes signifiers for certain ideals, such
as a good society, and in doing so, create new possibilities for the colonial
government – what an event/object means
is therefore crucial, and when its dominant signification alters, it is named
differently – as a crime. The politics of naming therefore also lies at the heart
of these problems. She clearly mentions “what
interests me is that the protection of woman (today the "third-world
woman") becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society which
must, at such inaugurative moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of
legal policy. In this particular case, the process also allowed the redefinition
as a crime of what had been tolerated, known, or adulated as ritual.”
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